Mary Jane O’Leary
IBEI BARCELONA
Masters in International Relations
Islam and Politics
Prof. Fred Halliday
April 2009
Introduction
By February 1979, eighteen months of massive popular mobilisation, strikes and demonstrations had forced the collapse of almost three decades of imperial rule in Iran (Greason 2005: 105). A largely unarmed coalition of middle-class intellectuals, students, merchants, workers, leftist activists and Muslim clerics brought down one of the world’s most well-armed dictatorships, the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, (Greason 2005:105). In the ensuing power struggle, hard-line fundamentalist cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini made his way to the apex of the alliance to become the spiritual leader and the de facto political power behind the new regime (Greason 2005: 106). In the process of establishing an Islamic Republic he attempted to eradicate potential opposition among his one-time allies and launched a “systematic campaign of terror” to root out the secular and liberal forces of the anti-shah movement (Greason 2005: 106). Leftists and liberals alike were persecuted, tortured and murdered, culminating in what has been called the mini-civil war of 1982-83 (Moghadam 1987:6). Marxists, who had moved out from under the anti-socialist tyranny of an imperial regime into the midst of a massive urban revolution were almost completely devestated. How did this happen? Did the left miss an opportunity to establish a socialist Iran or even to construct a coherent Marxist pillar in the new Republic? Where and how did they fail, was there ever any potential for success? What were the strategic and theoretical mistakes they made that led to this failure? In answering these questions this paper will focus on three propositions: firstly, that the left misinterpreted the social conditions that led to the revolution. Secondly, that it supported the wrong side as it struggled to gain a foothold in the new regime, and finally, serious theoretical shortcomings resulted in a failure to thoroughly critique the repressive aspects to the Islamic Republic.
The working-class and the Left
David Greason writes that an analysis of the relationship between the Iranian working class and left-wing parties reveals a fatally flawed assumption; that any leftist party actually had a base among the workers (Greason 2005: 116). The fervent pro-worker rhetoric, (and likely genuine aspirations for the proletariat) of most left-wing parties belied a tenuous link to a small and fragmented base. Independent labour unions had been suppressed and replaced by government-run syndicates following the return of the Shah in the 1953 coup and for the next twenty-five years the working class were kept fragmented and despondent (Moghissi, Rahnema 2004: 199). Despite some successes in the 1970s when large-scale strikes achieved some pay-increase demands, SAVAK, the secret police, had been largely effective in suppressing workers’ efforts to organise under the Pahlavi regime (Moghissi, Rahnema 2004: 199). The Revolution had injected a new freedom into organisation and shoras, or workers’ councils sprang up throughout Iranian industry. Nonetheless, the relatively small number of workers employed during the industrialisation continued to impede strong, influential unions while the predominance of pre-capitalist workshops and an underdeveloped division of labour also meant it was impossible to attain unity (Moghissi, Rahnema 2004: 200).
In interpreting this situation the communist Tudeh party recognised the absence of a strong base among the workers and followed a more national democratic, rather than a peoples’ democratic line when formulating their revolutionary theory. Meanwhile, other Marxist groups such as the Fedayeen Minority and Pekyar who persisted with attempts to organise the workers suffered from a serious overestimation of their own capacity to lead and the workers to organise and follow.
Interpreting Iranian society: Dependency theory and Third Worldism
This description of the working class and its links to the left is just part of the overall picture of Iranian society. In examining the socio-economic conditions that led to the Islamic Revolution Marxist explanations are often used to interpret the mounting strain between the classes as government-led capitalist growth aggravated divisions in society. At first glance the conditions deemed necessary for Marxist upheaval appear clean cut and the Shah’s modernisation programme is often used to illustrate this. Impelled by the tensions of the 1960s, as well as pressure from the USA in Cold War strategies, the Palhavi regime undertook what Halliday describes as “pre-emptive” modernising reforms (Halliday 2005: 101, 102). The Shah used the massive influx of oil revenues to lead and finance major industrialisation in an attempt to alleviate mounting antipathy (Greason 2005:107).
The ‘White Revolution’ incorporated a policy of import-substitution to expand the manufacturing and capital-intensive sectors in conjunction with the allocation of major concessions for multinational corporations (Moghadam 1987:11). In agriculture, sharecropping was initially established as a means of including peasants and family farms but it soon gave way to the promotion of large agribusinesses and capitalist ventures, trumping wealthy landowners as well as farm workers (Moghadam 1987:11). Women were granted more freedom through a number of secular social reforms and education and literacy programmes were set in motion (Halliday2005: 104). Importantly, the state also set about asserting a new, and deeply unpopular control over the many small and medium-sized operations traditionally centred around the Bazaar (Moghadam 1987:11). It even competed commercially with the Bazaaris when it opened modern, glossy stores selling equivalent products (Moghadam 1987:11).
The results: Secularisation was seen as a clear threat to the ideological authority of the Shi’ite hierarchy while, forced now to compete with the state and big capital, resentment began to fester among the Bazaaris and land owners (Moghadam 1987:13). Further still, the disenfranchised farmers and peasants flooding the cities in search of work came more and more to exemplify the “immiserated semi-proletariate” or mostazafin (dispossessed) of urban hardship (Moghadam 1987:11). Shanty towns sprouted up around the main cities and the mostazafin population in Tehran ballooned to 400,000 by 1976 (Saleth 2009:1). Left without services and basic necessities this stagnation paralleled the unbridled consumption among the privileged few in and around the shah as oil wealth continued to surge (Moghadam 1987:11).
In one sense the picture was viewed as follows: Iranian society consisted of an upper-class (including a comprador burgeoisie); an anti-imperialist middle class, and an urban working class (Halliday 2005). This perspective meant that analyses made in the 1970s often alluded to a “classic recipe for social revolution” (Halliday 1978: 1). Leftists in Iran employed this Marxist framework to explain the social tensions and presumed that any upheaval would be secular in character, directed by the left, with any clerical involvement a purely symbolic feature (Greason 2005: 116). But one of the most dominant features of their theorising on Iranian society was the dependency aspect.
The Tudeh Party called for the creation of an independent national economy, the Fedayeen Guerrillas were heavily influenced by the Cuban and Vietnamese experiences (Moghadam 1987:10). All groups focused on an over-dependence on foreign capital, ie dependence on the United States and Iran’s position in relation to the world economy was the basis for the development of all strategies. In general terms each group also developed a “distaste” for theorising beyond this point (Moghadam 1987:9). They failed to recognise the tendency towards exploitation of the Bazaar for example, the bazaaris were simply seen as part of the ‘popular mass’ (Moghadam 1978: 14). So too were the clerics, despite the increasing politicisation of the mullahs and their own aspirations for an Islamic rather than a socialist government. All reforms, progressive and repressive alike were denounced as imperialist, without room for an acknowledgement of growing literacy or women’s rights, the regime in all its manifestations was defamed. Rather than social liberation they called for national liberation (Moghadam 1978: 14).
Essentially the model was too simplistic, everyone who was not the state, its few elites or modern capital representatives were the ‘people’ (Moghadam 1987: 13,14). And most importantly socialist-democratic goals were subordinated to the urgency of the anti-imperial struggle. But why this confusion?
It was the unique way in which capitalism was produced in Iran that leads to this confusion in the analysis of the make-up of the social conditions and revolutionary forces. Via the Shah’s White Revolution of the 1960s capitalism was “grafted” crudely onto a pre-existing system, itself already in transition to capitalism (Saleth 2009:1). However, the power of the state in Iran had continuously disrupted this evolution and the reforms of the White Revolution further distorted class formation and the emergence of a bourgeois class in favour of a super-rich, western-orientated capitalist elite (Saleth 2009:1). This juxtaposed the under-lying class divide against what was in fact the primary divide in Iranian society; the ‘traditional/modern’ divide. Within the traditional sector of society bazaari merchants, land-owners and Shi’ite clerics were forced into opposition to the state and found themselves sharing common grievances (Saleth 2009:1). The modern capitalist elite associated with the state functioned as an uber-powerful minority in a stratum increasingly detached from traditional Iran, while the lower echelons of society consisted of a burgeoning urban migrant, worker and peasant population (Harman 2005:1). Flowing between these groups were ideas of Islamism, nationalism, anti-imperialism, urges to return to traditional pre-capitalism as well as an infatuation with modernity and the West. Many ‘modern’ intellectuals were anti-shah while many oil workers and teachers for example could be found in support of the regime. Notably, the revolutionary sentiment among the clerical elite, while avowedly anti-imperialist was later to prove itself just as anti-democratic (Moghadam 1987:12). Thus rather than a clear socio-economic framework many ideas and sectors overlapped in the Iranian society of the 1960s and ‘70s (Saleth 2009:1).
Leftists and the Islamic Republic
The Iranian left bifurcated in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution to represent what was essentially an “infatuation” with the populism and vociferous anti-imperialism of Khomeini on the one hand, and open and violent attempts to force the Revolution in to a socialist phase on the other (Moghissi, Rahnema 2004: 211, 212). The Tudeh Party and the Fedayeen Majority sought out an alliance with the Khomeini camp and stubbornly persisted with the idea that the regime posessed in general terms, an “objective progressive” character (Greason 2005: 106). The other branch, made up of smaller guerrilla groups such as Fedayeen Minority, Rah-e Kargar (Worker’s Path) and Peykar (Struggle), pursued open confrontation with a regime that did not hesitate to repress such ‘traitors’ quickly and brutally (Moghissi, Rahnema 2004: 212).
Thus arises one of the most puzzling questions in any study of the post-revolutionary phase in Iran: Why did the two left-wing parties, Tudeh and the Fedayeen Majority support Khomeini’s faction of clerics in the new regime and turn their criticisms instead towards the liberal nationalist Bazargan and his provisional government? The groups’ continued support of the mullahs and the Islamic Republic caused a serious rift in the Iranian left and was the cause of the split between the Majority and Minority factions in the Fedayeen. The ramifications for unity, and ultimately the ability of the left to sustain itself and finally defend itself as the new regime turned its fire against it, loom large. But first an examination as to the justifications for this support are necessary.
As mentioned above, Tudeh judged Iran to be at the national democratic stage of revolution and therefore at a stage in which a movement against the regime did not necessarily need to be led by communists. The theory drew on the Soviet idea of non-capitalist road to socialism; the idea that states with non-communist leadership could by-pass capitalism and still organise for eventual transition to socialism (Greason 2005: 115), especially prescient considering there was little evidence of a strong base among the proletariat in Iran at the time. The anti-imperialist rhetoric of Khomeini and actions such as the seizure of the American Embassy in November 1979 served to convince Tudeh of the regime’s credentials (Moghadam1978:21). Then, in its attempt to entrench itself with the new elite Tudeh propagated a pro-clergy lexicon (Moghadam 1987:23). Tudeh writers drew on similarities between the social principles of Shiism and scientific socialism and Islam was acclaimed as the “ideology of the anti-imperialist revolution” (Moghadam 1987: 23). In March 1981 Tudeh even backed the new regime as it ruled against other political parties and incitement of strikes on the grounds that anti-regime agitation would play into the hands of America (Behrooz 2000:150). They showered praise on the Ayatollah while choosing instead to attack the ‘liberal burgeoisie’ such as Bazargan and National Front members (Moghadam 1987:24).
Tudeh viewed the new regime as anti-capitalist as well as petit-bourgeois in the descriptive sense and thus deserving of its support, it failed to hypothesise beyond this to see that it was also simultaneously at odds with progressive socialist and democratic principles (Moghadam 1978: 20). Ideologically the stance belies a theoretical dualism at work below the surface. On the one hand Tudeh (and the Fedayeen) drew on the Leninist ideas of non-capitalist roads to socialism, hoping that nationalism via Khomeini’s state could prepare for a transition to socialism (Greason 2005: 115). On the other hand they seemed to willfully ignore Lenin’s call for struggle against the clergy, Islamic or otherwise (Greason 2005: 112). Meanwhile Khomeini had refrained from referring to any convergence of Islamic and Marxist goals, and was soon calling leftists traitors to the Revolution.
Analysis
In this brief review of the empirical data and analytical literature on the Iranian Revolution it appears that the biggest popular mobilisation in the world in the twentieth century was indeed a failure for the left. But how and why was it a failure? Assuming that the ultimate goal of the different Iranian leftist groups, Maoists, Marxists or Third World theorists, was at most to lead a revolution of the proletariat toward socialism or, considering their small number and historical experiences of repression, to at least participate in some constructive way in the new Republic, pushing for a more progressive and democratic aspect to new policies; they failed unequivocally on both counts. They had worked hard for the overthrow of the Shah, but were soon subjected to persecution by followers of Khomeini, and later targeted by the state itself, culminating in almost complete decimation in numbers and capacity by 1983 (Greason 2005: 106). But in analysing the mistakes they made leading to this failure it is important not to overstate the opportunities available to these groups to advance their cause in Revolutionary Iran. For example, when asking why the communist Tudeh party and the guerrillas of the Fedayeen (Majority) supported Khomeini even as he consolidated theocratic rule and turned on his former allies, it is clear that the alternative meant simply a fatalistic counterattack against a strong and brutal opponent who ultimately commanded the support of the overwhelming majority of the people.
Nor could these groups have been completely immune to the surge in the “political spirit” of the time. As mentioned above the Iranian Revolution was the largest mobilisation of people in the twentieth century, and according to the French philosopher Michel Foucault the swell of collective popular action was almost irresistible. Foucault visited Iran as a reporter and although he was later discredited for his political analysis of the Revolution he did recognised the uniqueness of the events unfolding at the time and his descriptive work on the atmosphere in Iran and the exploration of his concept of “political spirituality” helps us to understand the counterdiscourse that characterised the upheaval. The militant Islam that was the predominant characteristic of the movement strove to break socially, culturally and politically with the Western order, as well as the Soviet Union and China. The ardent anti-imperialism was potent. Iranian leftists must also have been as vulnerable to the lure of the “privileged idealised premodern past” as any other part of the population (Afary, Anderson, Foucault 2005:36). Although Marxism would have privileged modernity, the impoverishment of a large part of the Iranian population was seen as a direct consequence of the Shah’s industrialisation (Afary, Anderson, Foucault 2005:36). For Foucault the secular leftist students who took to the streets with the popular masses represented the heideggerian “freedom-toward-death”, reflecting perhaps the martyrdom glorified by Shia Islam (Afary, Anderson, Foucault 2005:6). To judge the actions and decisions of leftist groups outside this atmosphere is to disregard the overwhelming Iranian revolutionary zeitgeist. While criticism is necessary, especially considering Tudeh’s unwavering support of Khomeini even as he jailed and executed communists, it would be difficult to understand the decisions of some left groups outside of this singular Iranian context.
As regards a theoretical failing a brief quote from a Fedayeen writer illustrates the difficulties they faced at the time: “Owing to the rapidity of daily events we do not have sufficient time for rigorous periods of theoretical work and all-round ideological struggle to come up with answers to each and every question” (Moghadam 1987:22).
In this context most left groups drew heavily from dependency theories and hastily disregarded the advantages that a period of bourgeois democracy could bring. It was thus blinded to the fact that not every anti-capitalist movement is a step towards socialism.
Illustrating this is the fact in the run up to the Revolution the left and the religious right actually began to speak a similar language. Both sides focused on the Shah’s connections to US capital, they criticised the anti-national behaviour of the ruling elite and the detrimental effects of industrialisation (Moghdam 1987). The term mostazafin, or dispossessed was used by the mullahs to call on the oppressed to defeat their oppressors while Khomeini’s unrelenting attack on imperialism rallied virtually the entire population behind his banner. And it seems to be primarily on this point that many left-wing groups were willing to suppress their doubts and support the new regime. Actions such as the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran served only to solidify their support.
This is one of the major criticisms that continues to stick; many on the left compromised the independence of their ideology in the hope that the Islamic Republic would prove itself progressive in some aspects, and that it was at least anti-imperial, there seemed to be little room for criticism of its anti-democratic, chauvinistic aspects.
Structural factors also worked against the left. The make-up of society in Iran, the production of capitalism and the lack of a large coherent working class undoubtedly provided major hurdles. Sustained and targeted repression in the decades under the Shah and then again by the Islamic regime also deeply affected the organisational capacity of leftist groups. But two factors that could have been controlled and at least could have provided some strength to the movement were unfortunately never pursued.
Firstly unity was never a strong point for the Fedayeen, Tudeh, Mojahedin and Peykar (Moghadam 1987: 6). Some splits were caused by personal rifts, while others were down to theoretical divergences. Some groups were tied to Soviet foreign policies and theorising, while others such as the Mojahadin tried to reconcile Islam and Marxism. A pro-Chinese group had already split from the Tudeh in 1966, while the Fedayeen suffered a bitter divide between the Minority and Majority over whether or not to support the Islamic Republic (Moghadam 1987:9). This proved the most tragic and insurmountable divide between groups on the left in general, those that followed Khomeini in in the hope of some sort of compromise between secular and religious government simply postponed the same repression that their counterparts had suffered in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution. The obvious question is to what point should they have compromised their principals when faced with little alternative, should they have pursued a path of opposition despite the overwhelming power of their opponent, or have sought out some basic common interests and hoped for some opportunity to make changes form within? Pragmatism or purity of ideology (Moghadam 1978)? Considering the outcome for both sides of the argument in this case, it would have been better perhaps to stick with the basic principles from the beginning despite the appeal of power and pragmatism.
Secondly, the decision not only to support Khomeini, but to do so at the expense of an alliance with the liberal National Democratic Front or the Liberation Movement highlights a major miscalculation (Halliday 2005). The reasoning for the decision is probably linked to the privileged position of anti-imperialism and Third World theory in the discourse on the left but had the ultimate effect of stifling any coherent opposition to the Ayatollah when he did turn against his one-time allies. Parties like Tudeh thought they could bypass capitalism and work towards socialism within the regime and thus disregard capital representatives such as the liberals. But had they simply chosen the wrong set of bourgeois nationalists? As Molyneux and Halliday wrote ‘a period of bourgeois democracy would have been of far greater help to the left, and to the Iranian people as a whole, than the clerical tyranny now installed in Tehran’ (1984: 21).
Conclusion
Any failure or mistakes of the left must be viewed not in comparison to, but simply against the background of the success of the Khomeini faction in establishing the Islamic Republic. It is difficult to separate the Revolution from its broadly Islamic character and in trying to do so creates the impression of agitated masses in search of leadership, at which point it could be said that the left failed to provide this leadership. Khomeini, the mullahs and their far reaching networks however, had taken up the leadership role of the movement from the very beginning. Furthermore the fortunes of the Iranian left are inextricably linked to the proportion of state repression suffered by the movement at different moments in history. When it emerged from the repression of the Pahlavi regime there was therefore no great potential for organisation or leadership. The left failed in developing a theoretical framework to deal with the complexities of society and the revolutionary forces, it also splintered and pushed away its only possible ally in the face of a repressive theocracy. Any great failure however, must be viewed in the context of the minute potential for success.
Bibliography
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